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The  Phoenix  TRUCE Project was  modeled after the  Chicago  CeaseFire  pro- 
gram.   There  have  been   relatively few  process   and  impact  evaluations  on 
the  model  compared to  the  level  of funding  and  attention the  program has 
rendered.  This  paper  presents  findings  related  to   the   evaluation  of  the 
TRUCE project. We found  that the  program engaged in a strong  media  cam- 
paign,  conducted conflict  mediations, and  identified high-risk  individuals  for 
case  management. The  program did  not, however, establish a  coordinated 
and  collaborative relationship with  the  faith-based community or other 
community groups.   Time-series analysis  showed  that  program implementa- 
tion  corresponded to  a significant  decrease in overall  levels  of  violence  by 
more  than  16 incidents on average per  month, a decrease of 16 assaults on 
average per  month, and resulted in a significant  increase of 3.2 shootings  on 
average per  month, controlling for  the  comparison areas and  the  trends in 
the  data. 
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  Introduction 
 
In  the   mid-1990s,  the   University  of  Illinois’  School  of  Public  Health,  led  by 
5 Gary Slutkin,  established the  Chicago  CeaseFire  program. From  the  start, the 
 Chicago  Ceasefire  program relied  on a public  health model  that used  commu- 
 nity   mobilization,  community  awareness,  and   youth   intervention  and   out- 
 reach to  focus  on  reducing retaliatory  violence of  youth   in  high  gun  crime 
 areas of  Chicago  (Webster, Vernick,  & Mendel,  2009).  The  program sought  to 
10 change   the   behavior  of  a  small  number of  youth  who  were   at high  risk  of 
 being   victims   or  perpetrators  of  gun  violence  in  the   near   future  (Skogan, 
 Hartnett, Bump,  & Dubois,  2008,  pp.  8-11).  The  highly  publicized results  of 
 the   project  were   remarkable.  They  showed   that  the   number   of  shootings 
 declined in  several of  the  targeted  neighborhoods by  16  to  35% and  retalia- 
15 tory   gang  homicides  declined  by  100% in  each   of  the   five  targeted  areas 
 (Skogan  et al., 2008). 
 Given the  seriousness of the  youth  violence problem for local, national, and 
AQ1  international  communities (Pridemore, 2003),  the  Chicago  CeaseFire program 
  represents an  important  innovation in responding to  youth  violence (Chaskin, 
 20 2010).  If successful,  Chicago  Ceasefire  can  reduce shootings  by up to  35% and 
  virtually   eliminate  retaliatory  shootings   in  high-violence  communities.   This 
  would  not  only  have  a  substantial impact on  the  victims  of  violence through 
  the  reduction of injury  and death, but  it would also reduce fear  of crime, emo- 
  tional  distress, and  health care  costs  among  all  members of  those   communi- 
 25 ties.  To  date,  however, the   utility   of  the   Chicago   CeaseFire   program   for 
  reducing youth  violence is largely  undetermined because there have  been  few 
  subsequent  replications  and   evaluations  (for   exceptions  see   Skogan  et al., 
  2008; Webster,  Whitehill, Vernick,  & Curriero, 2012; Webster,  Whitehill, Ver- 
  nick,  & Parker, 2012; Wilson & Chermak, 2011). 
 30 This paper presents our  findings on the  Phoenix  TRUCE project, a Ceasefire 
  replication site,  which  received technical assistance from  Chicago  CeaseFire 
  project personnel. While there are  a  number of  differences between Chicago 
  CeaseFire  and  Phoenix  TRUCE with  respect to  community, program implemen- 
  tation, and  evaluation, we  believe that  the  implementation of  the  program, 
 35 and  its subsequent evaluation, will allow  researchers and  policy-makers to  fur- 
  ther   understand the  generalizability of  the  impact of  the  Chicago  CeaseFire 
  program on gun violence. The purpose of this  paper is to  examine the  impact 
  of the  Phoenix  TRUCE project on violence and shootings  through a quasi-exper- 
  imental  longitudinal design.   In the  sections below, we  present the  Ceasefire 
 40 Model,  prior  research on  the  model, and  our  methodology for  evaluating the 
  Phoenix  TRUCE Project. 
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The Chicago Ceasefire Model 
 
Today,  the  Chicago  CeaseFire  program (now  known  as  Cure  Violence, will be 
referred to as  CeaseFire) is a popular strategy for  addressing gun  violence. It 
has  been  implemented in several American  cities, including  Baltimore, Kansas          5 
City,  New Orleans, New York City,  Albany,  Buffalo,  Oakland,  Philadelphia, as 
well  as  in  several  locations  throughout  the   world,   including   Iraq,   England, 
South  Africa, and  Trinidad  and  Tobago  (ceasefirechicago.org, 2012).  CeaseFire 
was designed to  focus  on those  select few  who are  the  most  at risk for  “being 
shot  or being  a shooter”  in the  near  future. It also  attempts to  change  norms          10 
about violence among  targeted individuals  and  neighborhoods by altering  how 
they  perceive the  short-   and  long-term prospects of  violence (Skogan  et al., 
2008).  The CeaseFire  model  calls  for the  implementation of several core  strat- 
egies  for  the  purpose of  having  an  impact on  the  decision-making process   of 
those   who  are  involved  in  shootings. The  goal  is to  reduce the  risk  that the           15 
youth  will  engage   in  violence  which,   over  time, will  result in  changing   the 
norms  toward violence in the  community. 
One  of  the  primary  elements of  the  CeaseFire   model  is identification and 
detection  (Maguire,   2012).   The  model   is  centered  around   the   concept  of 
enhancing  a  community’s   capacity  to   identify  and   target  its   high-violence         20 
neighborhoods and  individuals. Prior  research suggests  that a small  number  of 
people,  places,  and   guns   (Sherman   &  Rogan,   1995)   are   disproportionally 
responsible  for  gun  violence.  By targeting  scarce  resources  on  these  focal 
points,  implementers  can  direct  interventions toward those people, places, 
and  guns that need  the  greatest attention. Prior  research has  shown  that pro-          25 
grams  and  strategies  that  accurately diagnose the   problem  are   significantly 
more  likely to impact violence (Klofas,  Hipple,  & McGarrell,  2010).  The Cease- 
Fire model, therefore,  emphasizes thorough analysis  to  identify those  individu- 
als  and  neighborhoods that  are  most  at risk  for  imminent violence (Webster 
et al., 2009).                                                                                                                                  30 
Another  core  component of the  CeaseFire Model is community mobilization, 
which   involves   faith-based  leaders,  community coalitions,  and   public   cam- 
paigns  against  violence.  Community   mobilization efforts  are   largely   concen- 
trated on altering the  norms  and  values  of the  community away  from  violence 
and  toward the peaceful resolution of conflict. To do this,  community mobili-          35 
zation  tactics often include  the  development of community coalitions with  the 
involvement of schools, churches, businesses, residents, and  public  health and 
criminal  justice agencies. Together, these groups  develop a  community com- 
mitment  toward reducing violence while  addressing the  underlying   structural 
causes   of  neighborhood violence.  They  also  coordinate  anti-violence services         40 
that  successfully change  cultural and  behavioral norms  and  increase the  com- 
munity’s capacity to  respond to  violence (Skogan et al., 2008; Webster, White- 
hill,   Vernick,   &  Curriero,  2012).   The   most   widely   recognized  aspect   of 
mobilization efforts  are   typically   found  in  their   public  education  campaigns
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5 which rely on flyers,  posters, pamphlets, t-shirts, and  other forms  of media, to 
promote nonviolence in the  community. 
In  addition  to   violence  identification  and   community mobilization, the 
CeaseFire  model  emphasizes the  role  of outreach workers  and  violence inter- 
rupters. Both  of  these positions   call  for  the   employment of  individuals   who 
10 possess  unique  street  knowledge and  credibility. They  are  typically  from  the 
targeted  neighborhood and  are  often former gang  members and  drug  dealers 
who  were  involved  in  serious  criminality and  violence. Outreach workers  are 
largely  responsible for  case   management,  conflict   mediation, and  mentoring 
which  means  it  is important for  them  to  hold  more  complex  and  personalized 
15          relationships with  clients. They  help  clients find jobs,  counsel  them  on  alter- 
native   methods for  dealing   with  conflict, and  help  them   address underlying 
risk  factors for  violence (Skogan  et al., 2008; Webster,  Whitehill, Vernick,  & 
Curriero, 2012). Violence interrupters are more  specialized and are  largely 
responsible  for  identifying  and  responding  to  retaliatory violence before it 
20 intensifies  (Ritter,   2009).   While   outreach  workers    are   typically    full-time 
employees  of  the   program,  violence interrupters  may  be   volunteers,  or  if 
they  are  employed by  the   program,  it is  on  a  part-time basis  with  minimal 
pay  (Skogan et al., 2008). 
 
 
Prior Research on the  Ceasefire Model 
 
25 The  Phoenix  TRUCE  Project was  modeled after Chicago  CeaseFire, which  has 
been  replicated in a number of different cities  in the  United  States and  inter- 
nationally. However, there have  been  only a few formal  evaluations of the  pro- 
gram.  Outside  of  Chicago,  for  example,  only  three sites, Newark,  Baltimore, 
and  Pittsburgh,  have   been   formally   evaluated.  As will  be  discussed  below, 
30          some   have   argued   that  there were   substantial  implementation  differences 
between Chicago  CeaseFire and  the  programs replicated  in Newark  and  Pitts- 
burgh. As a  result they  argue  that the  findings  attributable to the  latter pro- 
grams  should  not  necessarily be  generalized to  the  CeaseFire model  (C. Kane 
[personal  communication,  May 3,  8  and   16,  2012]).   Below,  we  review   the 
35          results of  the  four  prior  evaluations, discussing  their   results and  implications 
for understanding the  effectiveness of CeaseFire. 
 
 
 
Chicago CeaseFire 
 
Chicago  Ceasefire  began  in 1999 and  eventually was implemented in 27 target 
areas. Skogan et al.’s (2008) evaluation reported that outreach workers  played 
40          a  key  role   in  the   program.  The   outreach  workers   managed  caseloads  of 
high-risk  individuals  who  they  determined were  the  most  likely  to  shoot  or to 
be  shot  at. The  impact evaluation of  Chicago  CeaseFire  relied  on  16 years  of 
data that focused on  violent   crime  trends;  specifically violent   shootings   and
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killings.  These  data were  used  to  compare violent  crime  trends in seven  tar- 
geted areas with  the  violent  crime  trends in seven  matched comparison areas           5 
(Skogan  et al., 2008).  Given  the   complexity  of  the   project—multiple  sites, 
city-wide trends—time-series  analyses were  employed to  examine its  impact. 
Additionally, the  authors used  social  network analysis  to examine whether gang 
homicide networks weakened over time. 
Skogan et al.  (2008)  found  that in four  sites  CeaseFire  was  associated with          10 
“distinct and  statistically significant  declines” in  actual and  attempted  shoot- 
ings.  The  authors also  reported that the  declines of  violence in  these areas 
ranged  from  16 to 35%, while  six of the  sites  were  reported to  be  “noticeably 
safer”  as  a  result of  the  CeaseFire  program.  Also, increased safety was  mea- 
sured  by decreases in size  and  intensity of  shooting  hotspots and  the  evalua-           15 
tors   credited  the   decrease  of   violence  in   four   of   the   six  sites,  to   the 
introduction  of  CeaseFire.   Additionally,  using   social   network analysis, the 
authors reported that  gang  homicide  density   decreased in  two  of  the   sites, 
retaliatory gang killings decreased in four  of the  sites, and gang involvement in 
homicide decreased  in  three of  the   sites. As  a  result of  these findings,  the           20 
evaluators concluded that the  program  had  a strong  potential to reduce shoot- 
ings and killings (Skogan et al., 2008). 
However,  Maguire  (2012),   suggested that  the   above   results  were   not   as 
straightforward as  they  may  appear. Through  a  lengthy   post  hoc  analysis  of 
the   evaluation,  Maguire   (2012)   points   out   that  the   evaluation  by  Skogan          25 
et al. (2008)  focused on  three  outcome measures in  seven  zones  for  a  total 
of  21 outcome measures. Through  a  re-presentation of these  results,  Maguire 
(2012)   illustrated  that  “among   the    21   sets    of   outcomes,  12   favor   the 
comparison areas …,  8 favor  the  treatment areas …,  and  1 favors  neither …” 
(pp.  8-10).  Maguire  (2012)  also  noted that the  social  network analysis  exam-           30 
ining  reciprocal shootings   was  similarly  interpreted in  an  optimistic fashion. 
Among the  eight sites  where  retaliatory shootings  were  examined, retaliatory 
shootings   were   reduced in  half.   In  the   other half,   no  demonstrable  change 
was exhibited. 
It   is  unclear  what   factors  might   have   caused  a   decline  in   reciprocal         35 
shootings   in  half   the   areas,  while   the   other  half   of   the   areas   was   not 
affected. For  example, Project Safe  Neighborhoods (PSN) was  carried out  at 
the   same  time   and  in  50% of  the   same  locations as  Chicago  CeaseFire   (Pa- 
pachristos,  Meares,   &  Fagan,   2007).   In  fact,  the   authors  concluded  that, 
“after  controlling  for  the   social,   demographic,  and  PSN factors, no  statisti-        40 
cally  significant  effect in the  declining  homicide rates during  the  observation 
period   can  be  attributable purely  to  the  presence of  Operation  Ceasefire  in 
the  PSN treatment areas”  (Papachristos et  al.,  2007,  p. 264).  These  findings 
when  taken together suggest   that,  contrary to popular belief, the  CeaseFire 
program  may   not   have   been    as   effective  in   reducing  violence  as   first          45 
promoted.
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Operation Ceasefire Newark 
 
Ceasefire   Newark  was  one   of  the   first  near-replication  sites   in  the   nation. 
Because  of the  high rates of gun violence in Newark,  stakeholders were  com- 
5          mitted to  implementing two  promising  strategies at the  time: Boston’s  Opera- 
tion  Ceasefire   and  Chicago  CeaseFire. In other words,  Operation Ceasefire   in 
Newark  is a hybrid  that implements elements of both  the  Boston  and  Chicago 
programs, for  the  purpose of  reducing gun  violence in Newark’s most  violent 
neighborhoods. 
10              In 2004,  a  working  group  examined available  police  data and  identified a 
two-square-mile area, later referred to as the  Ceasefire Zone (CF Zone),  where 
Operation Ceasefire  would  later take  place. The CF Zone was characterized as 
having higher  rates of gun violence than  other neighborhoods in Newark (Boyle, 
Lanterman, Pascarella, & Cheng,  2010).  The program  included five elements of 
15 Chicago  CeaseFire: public  education,  community mobilization, youth  outreach, 
faith-based leader  involvement, and  criminal   justice participation.  However, 
Newark  CeaseFire differed  from  Chicago  CeaseFire   in  a  few  important  ways. 
First,  it  did  not  make  use  of  violence interrupters.  Second,  outreach workers 
did  not  employ  a  case  management approach to their   clients.  Third,  Newark 
20 CeaseFire   employed outreach  workers   who  might  have  been   church   congre- 
gants  as well as ex-offenders (Boyle et al., 2010, p. 107). 
Similar to Boston CeaseFire, the police played  a strong  role in Newark’s 
implementation of CeaseFire. Shooting  teams were  responsible for the  “aggres- 
sive investigation of shootings” in the  CF Zone.  Police  were  also responsible for 
25          notifying  CeaseFire partner organizations of shootings  for the  purpose of mobi- 
lizing  resources,  and  for  working  with  parole   officers  to  monitor parolees  in 
the  CF Zone.  However, while  Boston  Ceasefire  emphasized the  importance of 
“pulling levers” and  collective accountability, the  Newark  Ceasefire project  did 
not  employ  this  strategy. The  reason for  this  is simply  because Newark  gangs 
30          and  groups  did  not  possess  the  organizational structure  or  cohesiveness that 
would warrant such an approach (Boyle et al., 2010). 
Boyle  et  al.   (2010)   examined  the   effectiveness  of   Operation  Ceasefire 
through the   analysis  of  admissions  to  a  Level  1  trauma center.  Specifically, 
they  examined the  number  of gunshot  wounds  that occurred in the  CF Zone,  as 
35          well as a comparison area.
1   
The analysis  consisted of a three-year period  from 
1  January  2004  through  31  December  2006.   Time-series  analysis   illustrated 
that, in Newark,  Operation Ceasefire  had  no significant impact on the  number 
of gunshot  wounds.  Some advocates of the  Chicago Ceasefire  model, however, 
maintain that these findings are  not  reflective of the  Chicago Ceasefire model, 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  The comparison area  was  matched and  subsequently selected based  on the  number of gunshot 
wounds  and  census  data that reflected the  target areas ethnicity, age,  household income, poverty, 
and housing vacancies.
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given  the  lack  of  implementation fidelity  delivered in  Newark  (C.  Kane  [per-           5 
sonal  communication, May 3, 8 and 16, 2012]). 
 
 
 
Baltimore’s Safe Streets Program 
 
In 2007,  the  US Department of Justice funded  the  Baltimore’s Safe Streets Pro- 
gram  to  implement the  Chicago  CeaseFire program  in Baltimore. Initially,  the 
only  programmatic difference between Chicago  and  Baltimore was  the  use  of          10 
violence interrupters because violence interrupters were  not  employed as part 
of the  Baltimore project.  Instead, outreach workers  were  responsible for  con- 
flict  mediation, as  well  as  for  intervening in  the  lives  of  at-risk   youth.  Over 
time, the  program grew  from  one  targeted  community (McElderry Park) to five 
targeted  communities (McElderry  Park,  Union Square, Ellwood  Park,  Madison-          15 
Eastend, and  Cherry  Hills) (Webster et al., 2009; Webster,  Whitehill, Vernick, 
& Curriero, 2012; Webster, Whitehill, Vernick,  & Parker, 2012). 
Daniel  Webster   and  a  team of  public  health scholars   from  Johns  Hopkins served 
as the  evaluation team. They produced a number of public  manuscripts documenting 
program fidelity  and effectiveness in the  Baltimore sites. The first          20 was  an  
interim  evaluation report  based   on  data  collected  through October 
2008,   which   focused  only  on  the   first   three  sites:  McElderry  Park,  Union 
Square,  and   Ellwood  Park.   Here,   the   authors  reported  mixed   findings.  For 
example,   in  McElderry  Park   homicides  declined  (particularly  among   those 
under   age  30),  but  nonfatal shootings   increased,  especially when  contrasted        25 
with  the  comparison areas. In Union Square, homicides and  shootings  actually 
increased  in   the    target  area.  In   Elwood   Park,   homicides  and   shootings 
remained stable;  however, nonfatal shootings   did  decline in  the  target area 
(Webster et al., 2009). 
In 2012,  the  evaluators released the  final  report that examined the  impact         30 
of  the  program   in four  sites—McElderry  Park,  Elwood  Park,  Madison-Eastend, 
and  Cherry  Hill—relying on data through December 2010.  This time  the  results 
were  more  impressive, with  three of four  neighborhoods reporting a significant 
decline in homicides and  nonfatal shootings. The evaluators claimed that over 
112 months,  the  program in the  four  neighborhoods had  prevented five homi-          35 
cides  and  35 nonfatal shootings. Following  the  public  success  of the  program, 
in late  2011,  the  US Department of Justice provided an additional $2.2  million 
in funding  to  support the  Baltimore Safe  Streets Program  (Webster, Whitehill, 
Vernick,  & Curriero, 2012; Webster, Whitehill, Vernick,  & Parker, 2012). 
These  findings  should  be  interpreted with  caution,  however. Three  of  the           40 
five program implementation  sites  (Ellwood  Park, Union Square, and  Madison- 
Eastend) were  shut  down  shortly  after being  established. Several  local  news 
stories focusing  on the  program  revealed that the  Union Square  site  was closed 
after one  year  as a consequence of the  city  terminating its  contract with  the 
local   nongovernmental  organization  (NGO) that  managed the   site. The  city          45 
learned  through local  and  federal law  enforcement that a  local  street  gang
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(the  Black Guerilla  Family) had  infiltrated the  program. Gang members, one  of 
which  was a gang leader, were  working  for  the  Union Hills Safe  Streets site  as 
outreach workers  for the  purpose of obtaining cover  for their  gang’s heroin  dis- 
5 tribution  network (Fenton,  2012; Kelly, 2010).  Two other sites—Ellwood  Park 
and  Madison-Eastend—closed in 2010,  but  little information about the  reason 
for  their   closures   has  been  revealed in  the  media  or  interim, final,  or  peer- 
reviewed manuscripts (see  Webster et al.,  2009; Webster, Whitehill, Vernick, 
& Curriero, 2012; Webster, Whitehill, Vernick,  & Parker, 2012).  These  closures 
10 suggest  that  implementation and/or the   sustainability  of  such  complex   pro- 
grams  might be difficult. 
 
 
Pittsburgh’s One Vision One Life 
 
Pittsburgh’s One Vision One Life (otherwise known as One Vision) program  was 
established as a result of several grass  roots  organizations joining  together to 
15          seek  an  innovative evidence-based  response to  violence in Allegheny  County. 
Community   leaders began   by  diagnosing   the   County’s  violence problem and 
conducting research  on  best   practices. Following  consultation  with  partners 
and  the  police, the  Pittsburgh program was “modeled after (but  [did]  not  mir- 
ror)”  Chicago  and   Baltimore  CeaseFire  programs  (Wilson  &  Chermak,  2011, 
20          p.  995).  The One Vision program  adopted a six-point  plan  to  reduce shootings. 
The  plan  consisted of (1) mediating and  intervening in conflicts, (2) providing 
outreach to  at-risk  youth, (3)  building  strong  community coalitions, (4)  publi- 
cizing  a  no-shooting  message,  (5)  rapidly   responding  to   violence  in  target 
areas, and  (6) developing programming for  at-risk  youth  (One Vision One Life, 
25 no date). The One Vision program was more  similar  to  Baltimore than  Chicago 
in its  use  of outreach workers. Community  coordinators served  as generalists, 
addressing  a  variety of  community needs, and  were   responsible  for  conflict 
intervention, mediation, and  other outreach work  with  at-risk   youth. Others 
have  also  noted that  One  Vision was  different from  Chicago  CeaseFire with 
30          respect to  police  participation in the  project.  Specifically, in Pittsburgh, com- 
munity  coordinators rarely  conferred with  the  police, and  when  they  did,  the 
interaction was often negative (Maguire,  2012). 
A  rigorous  evaluation of  the  One  Vision program  was  conducted by Wilson, 
Chermak, and  McGarrell (2011).  The evaluators relied  on a quasi-experimental 
35          design   comparing three  target  areas   to  matched  comparison areas.  Wilson 
et al.  (2011)  found  that  program implementation either increased or  did  not 
affect  homicides. Further, they   reported that the   program increased  aggra- 
vated assaults and gun assaults in the  target areas  (Wilson et al., 2011).  Wilson 
et al.  (2011)  caution that the  implementation of the  Chicago  CeaseFire  model 
40 has varied  by site  and  that researchers do not  yet  know which components, or 
aspects of each  component, have  the  most  impact on gun violence. For exam- 
ple,  while  outreach workers  in Pittsburgh engaged in more  community mobili- 
zation  than  outreach workers  in other sites, it is not  clear  whether or not  the
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activity of the  outreach worker  plays  a unique  role  in increasing or decreasing 
shootings.  Thus,  Wilson  et al.   recommended that  future  evaluations should          5 
continue to examine how the  different levels  of implementation are  related to 
the  impact of the  program. 
 
 
 
The Phoenix  Truce  Project 
 
The Phoenix  TRUCE Project was modeled after the  Chicago CeaseFire  program, 
and  as such, had  adopted a public  health approach in responding to  violence in          10 
the  community. By focusing  attention on  the  gun  violence, TRUCE  sought  to 
first  and  foremost diminish  shootings. Other  potential reductions in crime  and 
community improvement were  expected, but  were  not  necessarily the  primary 
focus  of  the   TRUCE  effort. TRUCE used  carefully selected  outreach workers 
and violence interrupters with ties  to the  local  community. The outreach work-          15 
ers  recruited members of the  community who  were  identified as being  at risk 
of being  potential victims  and  or perpetrators of gun violence. Outreach work- 
ers  were  to  use  a set  of seven  criteria to help  them  guide  client selection by 
assessing   each   potential client’s  appropriateness  for  inclusion   in  the   TRUCE 
caseload. Individuals  possessing  four  or more  of the  seven  criteria were  consid-           20 
ered  high risk,  making them  good candidates for recruitment. The seven  at-risk 
criteria were: (1) Gang involvement; (2) Key role  in a gang;  (3) Prior  criminal 
history;  (4)  Recently released  from  prison;   (5)  High-risk  street  activity;  (6) 
Recent victim  of a shooting; and (7) Young (aged  16–25 years  old). 
The  lead  agency  of the  Phoenix  TRUCE project was  Chicanos  Por La Causa,          25 
Inc.  (CPLC). CPLC is a statewide organization with  800 employees, 40 years  of 
experience,  and  the   resources needed  to  develop, implement,  sustain,  
and manage programs and  services. At this  point  in time, the  CPLC had  26 
years  of experience  in  community-based prevention.  It  is  considered  by  
many  in  the 
state to  be  one  of the  premier NGOs serving  the  Hispanic/Latino community.
2              
30 
CPLC received technical assistance from  the  Chicago  Project for  Violence  Pre- 
vention  (CPVP), which  was  responsible for  the  creation of the  Chicago  Cease- 
Fire  model.  CPVP provided street  outreach  and   violence  interruption   skills 
training to the  Phoenix  TRUCE team, while lending  ongoing violence prevention 
program and planning  support.                                                                                      35 
The Phoenix  TRUCE target area  is located in the  South Mountain area, and  is 
largely  comprised of some  of the  city’s oldest homes  and  businesses. The com- 
munity   is  comprised  of  deeply   rooted  intergenerational  gangs,   dilapidated 
 
 
 
2.  CPLC’s Director  of Prevention was responsible for fiscal and  contract management. The Program 
Manager oversaw  implementation and supervised project staff. The Prevention Services  Coordinator 
was  responsible for  community partnerships  and  coordinating prevention efforts among  partners. 
Outreach staff  consisted of four  outreach workers  (one  of which  was the  supervisor) and  four  vio- 
lence  interrupters (this  went  down  to  two  toward the  end  of the  project). Outreach workers  and 
violence interrupters were  two distinctly separate positions.
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properties,  and   an  emerging  and   shifting   neighborhood  composition,  which 
5 makes  it  a  community in  a  stressful transition that  has  been   the  subject  of 
prior  research  (Portillos, Jurik,  & Zatz,  1996; Zatz  & Portillios, 2000).  South 
Mountain  is challenged by high-crime rates,  a  struggling  economy, and  urban 
decay. Most alarming  is the  disproportionate use  of firearms  to  commit crime. 
The Arizona Department of Health  Services  (AZDHS) reported that 80% of homi- 
10          cides  were   firearm   related in  South  Mountain  (Shacter, 2009).  Related, the 
Phoenix   Police   Department’s  South  Mountain  Police   Precinct experienced a 
large  increase in violent  crime  in 2007.  During the  first  11 months  of 2007,  62 
homicides were  committed, a  41% increase over  the  previous  year. Hermoso 
Park,  a neighborhood within  the  South  Mountain  area  was selected as the  tar- 
15 get  area  for  the  TRUCE  project given  its  high  level  of violence. The  Hermoso 
Park neighborhood is approximately 1.5  by 1 mile  in size  and  has  about  12,000 
residents. While the  majority of its  residents are  Hispanic  (54%), it  has  one  of 
the   highest   proportions  of  African-American residents  in  the   city  (40%).  Its 
median  household income  is about $34,000  a year, which  is substantially lower 
20 than  the  rest  of the  city.  Consistent  with  the  goal  of appropriately diagnosing 
the  problem, the  above  information was  used  to  identify the  Hermoso  Park 
community as the  best  target area. It  was found  to  be  a good  fit for  the  pro- 
gram,  given  the  violent  crime  incidents and  population characteristics  of  the 
community (Skogan et al., 2008).  One possible  concern was that while the  geo- 
25          graphic  size  of  Hermoso  Park  was  consistent with  the  Chicago  model, it  was 
much  less densely  populated. 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
In order  to  evaluate the  Phoenix  TRUCE project, we  conducted both  the  pro- 
cess  and  impact evaluation; both  are  described below. The process  evaluation 
30 examined the  extent to which  the  community and  target  populations experi- 
enced the  TRUCE project. The impact evaluation, in turn, measured how varia- 
tions  in TRUCE dosage  were  related to  variations in violent  crime  in the  target 
area. 
In  conducting  the   process   evaluation  of  the   Phoenix   TRUCE project, we 
35 relied  on data pertaining to  the  implementation process and  specific  interven- 
tion  activities. The process  evaluation was organized around  the  five core  com- 
ponents  of  the   Phoenix   TRUCE project,  which   were   aligned   with   Chicago 
CeaseFire   model. The  five  components are:   (1)  Community  mobilization;  (2) 
Youth outreach and  intervention; (3) Faith-based leader involvement; (4) Pub- 
40          lic education; and (5) Criminal justice participation. 
The data used  to  examine the  project’s implementation were  primarily  col- 
lected from  two  sources, including  interviews and  observations of TRUCE staff 
and other stakeholders and the  Chicago Project for Violence Prevention Evalua- 
tion  Database.  First,  semi-structured interviews were  conducted regarding the 
45          implementation process and  programmatic activities. In all,  12 semi-structured
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interviews were  conducted with  TRUCE  staff members and  project stakehold- ers.  
Interviews took  place  between June  2011 and  October 2011.  Related, the  evaluation  
team regularly  attended project functions,  activities, and  partners’ meetings. Second, 
the  Project for Violence  Prevention Evaluation  Database was examined.  The  database  
is  an  online   system   developed  for  use  by  Chicago          5 
CeaseFire   model  sites  (such  as  Phoenix)  for  use  in  recording and  evaluating 
important components of CeaseFire sites. The system  integrates recording and 
reporting tools  for participant intake, shootings, violence interrupter logs,  con- 
flict mediations, and community activities. This detailed level  of data for inter- 
vention     activities    provided    a    quantitative    base     for     evaluating    the           10 
implementation of core  components. 
The  impact evaluation relied  on  a  pre-test/post-test nonequivalent control 
group  design.  The methodology relies  on a target area  where  the  intervention 
takes  place  and three comparison areas, which were  purposely matched as clo- 
sely  as  possible   to  the   targeted area. Data  were   collected from  target and          15 
comparison areas  before and after program implementation. 
We identified comparison areas  by constructing a  disadvantage index  score 
for  all  census  blocks  in Phoenix. This allowed  us to  identify areas  of  the  city 
that were  most  comparable to  the  targeted area. After  we  scored  each  block 
group,  census, police,  and  hospital data were  used  to  identify five contiguous         20 
block  groups  (the  size  of the  target area) that best  matched our  target area. 
As a result, we  identified three comparison areas.
3   
Table  1 presents informa- 
tion  on the  characteristics of each  area. The comparison areas  were  matched 
well  with  the  target area  with  respect to  such  neighborhood characteristics  as 
population, number of households, vacant housing,  household income, and  ER         25 
visits  for  violence.
4  
There  was  one  important difference between the  target 
and  comparison areas. We were  unable to  identify any comparison area  with  a 
similar  ethnic  composition as  our  target area. About  40% of  the  residents  in 
the  target area  were  African-American compared  to 10,  6,  and  4% of those  in 
the  comparison areas. The  target area  is comprised of  the  largest  proportion         30 
of  African-American residents  in  the   city  (as  measured  within   5  continuous 
block   groups),  and   no   other   neighborhoods had   a   similar   proportion  of 
African-American residents. 
 
 
 
3.  The  authors were  not  aware of at the  time, nor  have  any  come  to  light  since  the  end,  of any 
other initiatives addressing violent  crime  in any  routinized or  programmatic manner in the  target 
area  or  control areas during  the  study  period. While policing  activities and  enforcement in high- 
crime  areas are  always  ongoing  and  might  impact any  programmatic effects,  both  positively  and 
negatively, we have  no information that policing  efforts were  fundamentally different before, dur- 
ing or after the  implementation period  effecting the  data used  in our analyses. 
4.  Although  two  of the  comparison areas had  noticeably higher  numbers of violent  crime  incidents 
reported to  police, the  areas were  matched well  in  terms of  structural disadvantage indicators. 
The comparison areas were  used  to  control for trends in violent  crime  within  areas of the  city that 
are   similarly  situated during  the   study  period. It  is  often difficult   to  identify identical  control 
areas, however, the  control areas allowed  us to  remove  trends in the  data that were  present  in 
other areas of the  city and which the  project could  not  reasonable account for.
RJQY 902092 
17 March 2014 
CE: GG   QA: AM 
Coll: QC: 
Initial 
RJQY 02092 
17 March 2014 
CE: GG  QA: AM 
Coll:     QC: 
Initial 
 
 
 
 
12        FOX ET AL. 
 
 
Table  1    Characteristics of target and comparison areas 
 
Area                                                                             Target         Area A          Area B        Area C 
 
Total  population1                                                                          11,771         11,749         11,294         12,519 
Total  households                                                     3,220           3,303           2,862           3,018 
Total  housing units                                                      3,322           3,581           2,986           3,172 
Vacant  housing units                                                       102              278              124              154 
% of units  vacant                                                         3                  8                  4                  5 
% White                                                                                22                45                57                49 
% Black                                                                                40                  4                10                  6 
% Hispanic                                                                           54                65                82                81 
Median household income                                      $34,426       $38,447       $35,490       $33,961 
 
Total  violent  incident reports 5/09  to 5/10               551              781              790              537 
 
1 
Based on ESRI 2008 Census Estimates. 
 
 
 
We measured the  impact of the  project using incident report data from  the 
5 Phoenix  Police  Department (PPD). The PPD provided  their  Computer-Aided Dis- 
patch (CAD) and  Record  Management System  (RMS) data. These  included all 
incidents reported  by  the  police  from  1  January 2007  through 31  December 
2011 (60 months) for the  target and  three comparison areas. Our analyses  plan 
initially  paralleled Wilson and  Chermak’s  (2011)  by focusing  on  three incident 
10          types, which  were   aggregated  monthly:  homicides,  shootings,  and  assaults
5
; 
and  we  also  added another crime  category that  included all  violent   incident 
reports
6
. In the  end,  however, homicides were  not  included as an independent 
 
 
 
5.  While the  initial  Chicago  CeaseFire program did  not  focus  on assaults, replication sites  such  as 
Pittsburgh and  Denver  have  used  assaults as an  outcome variable. Additionally, over  the  past  sev- 
eral  year’s solicitations for  OJJDP’s Community-Based Violence  Prevention Demonstration Program, 
which  is a major funding  mechanism for  CeaseFire/Cure Violence  replication sites, requires apply- 
ing sites  to demonstrate a violence problem related to three specific  measures: assaults, shootings, 
and  homicides. These  three measures are  the  same  as  those  used  by Wilson and  Chermak  and  in 
the  present study. We believe that the  inclusion  of assault as a primary  outcome measure was also 
important for  several other reasons. First,  and  perhaps more  importantly, Wilson and  Chermak’s 
finding that CeaseFire  was related to  a significant  increase in assaults has shifted much  of the  pol- 
icy discussion  surrounding the  efficacy  of  CeaseFire. If other replication sites  determine that the 
program increases assaults it  might  suggest  evidence of  a boomerang effect.  Second,  researchers 
have  long known that the  dynamics  of assault are  like those  of homicide in a number of ways such 
as  time   of  day,  day  of  week, age,   ethnicity, and  gender of  the   offender and  victim  (Pokorny, 
1965).  Related, researchers have  long  found  that the   developmental  processes associated  with 
assaults and  homicides are  similar  (Felson  & Steadman, 1983).  Third,  prior  research conducted in 
South  Phoenix  revealed that the  dynamics  of assault are  similar  to  the  dynamics  of shootings  and 
homicides (Arizona Criminal  Justice Commission,  2004).  Last,  the  CeaseFire model  has evolved  and 
is currently being  used  to  address nongun  related assault (Decker, Featherstone, Cantillon, & Slut- 
kin, 2013). 
6.  This  included only  homicides,  misdemeanor  and  felonious assaults,  robberies,  shootings, and 
other misconduct with a firearm.
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crime  category because the  base  rate was too low.  In the  year  preceding the 
Phoenix  TRUCE project, there had  been   only  three  homicides in  the   target 
area, and  while  in the  post-implementation period  homicides declined to  just           5 
one  (during  implementation there  were   4  homicides  and  17  shootings),  the 
numbers  were   far  too  low  to  conduct any  meaningful  analysis.  Analyses  of 
these data alone  would  have  resulted in low power, and  we  would  have  been 
unable to detect a significant  change.
7
 
We examined change  by comparing the  police  data 41 months  pre-implemen-         10 
tation to  the   19 months   post-implementation.
8   
Police  data  consisted of  dis- 
patched calls  for  service   (CFS), officer-initiated events,  and  callbacks, all  of 
which were  derived from  the  Phoenix  Police  Department’s CAD/RMS system. As 
mentioned above,  incidents recorded  by  the   police   were   coded   into  one  of 
three designated categories (i.e. assaults, shootings, and  all  violent  crime)  or          15 
were  removed from  the  analysis. Incidents described  as  “shootings” or  “shots 
fired”  were  compiled for  our  shooting  measure. Our assault measure was  cre- 
ated by aggregating the  following  incident types: assault, attempted  assault, 
aggravated   assault,    attempted   aggravated  assault,    cutting   or   stabbing, 
attempted cutting or stabbing,  subject threatening, and  fighting.  The measure         20 
for  all violent  incidents included the  incidents described above, as well  as the 
following:    purse   snatch,  attempted  purse   snatch,  strong   armed    robbery, 
attempted  strong-armed robbery, armed robbery, attempted  armed robbery, 
subject with a gun,  misuse  of weapon, and homicide. 
We use  a  number of  time-series models  to  assess  the  effects of  different        25 
forms  of “dosage” on the  outcome, while  controlling for the  trends in the  com- 
parison  areas.
9   
Specifically, we  used  pooled  cross-sectional time-series analy- 
sis.  This type  of analysis, for  example, allows  for  the  fact  that the  number of 
police  incident reports in one  month  is related to  the  number of  calls  in the 
previous  month  (temporal autocorrelation).  Additionally, the  model  allows  for          30 
the  fact  that the  target area  and comparison areas  might  all be affected in the 
same  way  in  a  given  month   for  an  unobserved exogenous reason.  Across  all 
models, we  control for  changes  in crime  that might  be  seasonal (by  month). 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  Additional  data were  available on emergency room  visits;  however, these data were  not  used  as 
an outcome because of the  low cell counts. 
8.  A  longer  evaluation period   would  have  been  ideal, however, the  project was  supported by  a 
large  federal grant  and much  of the  activity slowed  or stopped at the  end of the  grant  cycle. 
9.  We investigated the  possibility  that increases in violence could  trigger  increases in dosage  by 
lagging  the   dependent  variable (hence,  holding  constant previous   violent   crime   associated  with 
increase in dosage)  and  our  results did  not  change. The  more  parsimonious models  are  presented 
here. Additionally,  further investigation was conducted on the  temporal trends with  both  the  pre- 
dictor and  outcome since  correlations are  possible  even  without a  direct relationship.   We con- 
firmed  these temporal trends with a set  of Dickey–Fuller  tests.  We ran simulations to confirm  this, 
creating two  trending variables that  were  uncorrelated.   We also  found  that our  fixes  (including 
allowing  for  a correlated error  structure, lagging  the  dependent variable, lagging  the  independent 
variable) did not  produce the  nonsignificant results that would prove  a remedy in our simulations.
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This  longitudinal, multivariate  technique  allowed   us  to  isolate the   program 
5          effects as best  as possible  (Podesta, 2000).
10
 
 
 
 
Implementation Findings 
 
First,  we examined process  findings related to  youth  outreach and  intervention 
in  terms  of  program   dosage,  conflict   mediation,  client  selection,  and   risk 
reduction activity. Second,  we  examined the  public  awareness and  messaging 
10 they  received. Third,  we  examined criminal  justice participation.  And finally, 
we examine other issues  that emerged during program implementation. 
Youth  outreach  and   intervention  took   place   either  through an  outreach 
worker  or a violence interrupter. In terms of contacts, there was an average of 
more  than  300 contacts per  month  between outreach workers  and  clients, of 
15 which  on  average 42.4% (M = 127.6,  n = 2,297)  were  conducted face-to-face  in 
the  client’s home  or  on  the  street in their  community. On average, outreach 
workers  made  45.9 contacts per  client. As shown in Table  2, there were  a total 
of 118 clients during  implementation. Caseworkers made  5,381  contacts across 
118 participants. The  most  common  type  of contact was  made  by phone  (n = 
20          2,031,   37.7%),  closely   followed   by  home   visits   (n = 1,392,   25.9%).  Phoenix 
TRUCE personnel made   face-to-face contacts with  clients in  the   community 
42.4% (n = 2,297)  of the  time. All clients had  at least one  face-to-face contact 
since   their   intake date,  with  84.7% (n = 100)  of  clients having  five  or  more 
face-to-face contacts. The  average number of total face-to-face contacts per 
25          client was 39.1  (n = 5,414). As seen  in Table  2, 64.3% of all contacts lasted 60 
min or less.  The overall  average length  of a contact was from  about an hour  to 
an hour  and 15 min. 
Violence  interrupters  distinguish the   CeaseFire   model  from  other commu- 
nity-based  crime   prevention efforts.  The   role   of  the   violence  interrupter 
30 demands that one  maintain a  difficult  balance.  It  requires individuals  with  a 
history  of crime  and  violence, yet  who are  removed enough  from  that time  to 
value  a life and  community without the  violence. The importance of credibility 
on  the  streets was  summarized succinctly by one  of  the  TRUCE  stakeholders: 
“If you not  real  with  this  job,  you really  in the  wrong place, because somebody 
35          going  to  hurt   you.”  One  of  the   main  activities of  violence interrupters  and 
 
 
 
 
AQ2 
10.  Prior  to  the   interpretation of  the   findings  we  examined statistical  power; or  our  ability  to 
detect whether an effect exists. Statistical power  is a function of four elements: sample  size,  sam- 
ple  variance,  statistical  significance level,  and  effect size  (Cohen,   1988).   Our  power   analyses 
revealed that our  samples  had  sufficient sample  size  to  detect effects. For example, our  t-tests 
comparing the  mean  number of  shootings   between the  target group  and  Area  B have  statistical 
power  of .83  to  detect medium  effects (Cohen’s  d = .50).  Our comparisons between pre-  and  post- 
test periods  yielded  similar  results. In the  target and  comparison areas, for  instance, our  t-tests 
have  power  of .99 to  detect medium  effects. Such post  hoc statistical power  analyses are  typically 
only a  major concern in analyses that fail  to  detect differences or  effects. In the  present study, 
however, we detected a number of compelling findings.
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Table  2    Summary of program dosage  
 N % 
Number  of clients 118 100 
 
Number  of contacts 
 
5,381 
 
100 
Type of contact   
Phone 2,031 37.7 
Home 1,392 25.9 
Street 548 10.2 
Office 357 6.6 
Other 1,053 19.6 
Time spent with clients 
30 minutes or less 
 
1,781 
 
32.9 
30–60 minutes 1,697 31.4 
60–90 minutes 722 13.4 
90–120 minutes 510 9.4 
120–150 minutes 542 8.4 
150–180 minutes 178 3.3 
180–210 minutes 38 .7 
210 minutes or more 30 .6 
 
Conflicts  mediated 
 
58 
 
100.0 
Reason  for conflict   
Gang 27 46.6 
Personal altercation 19 32.8 
Domestic  violence 10 17.2 
Other 2 3.4 
 
 
outreach workers  was  to  stop  impending violent  conflicts in  the  target area. 
TRUCE  staff became aware of  conflicts in  a  variety of  ways,  and  then  made 
contact with  the  parties involved  in  an  effort to help  negotiate a  peace to 
reduce the  likelihood  of shootings. As seen  in Table  2, the  Phoenix  TRUCE pro- 
ject  engaged in  58  conflict   mediations  from   June   2010  through  December         5 
2011.  Table  2 shows that gang issues  were  the  most  frequent source  of conflict 
(n = 27, 46.6%). 
TRUCE  outreach workers  followed  the  CeaseFire   model  in selecting clients 
for  the  case  management  and  risk reduction components of the  program. The 
model  calls  for potential clients to  be identified as high risk for involvement in          10 
gun violence, either as victims  or perpetrators; using a rubric  of seven  at-risk 
characteristics: (1) Young—aged 16–25 years  old,  (2) Prior history  of offending, 
(3) Gang involvement, (4) Key role  or position  in the  gang,  (5) Involvement in 
high-risk  street activity, (6)  Recently released  from  prison,  (7)  Recent  victim 
(past  90 days) of a shooting.                                                                                             15
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Consistent  with   the   Chicago  CeaseFire   Model  clients  were   recruited  for 
Phoenix  TRUCE only if they  were  assessed as having four  of the  seven  selection 
criteria listed  above, thus  placing  them  in the  “high-risk” category. At the  time 
of this  analysis, a total of 118 clients had  been  fully enrolled; all of whom met 
5          at least four  of the  selection criteria.
11  
As seen  in Table  3, most  clients were 
male  (n = 86,  72.9%) and  the  majority of  clients were  Black/African-American 
(n = 93, 78.8%). The findings indicated that there was substantial program  fidel- 
ity  in  that TRUCE workers   selected  the   appropriate  high-risk  individuals   on 
whom  to  focus  their   attention. The  most  common   of  the  seven  risk  factors 
10          among  clients, as seen  in Table  3, was being  involved  in a gang,  with  89% (n = 
105)  of  clients identified as  such. Gang  membership was  closely  followed   by 
involvement in high-risk  street activity (n = 100,  84.7%).  More than  two-thirds 
(n = 79,  66.9%) of  clients were  between 16 and  25 years  old,  and  most  held  a 
key  position   in  the  gang  (n = 67,  56.8%).  Thirty-three clients (28%) had  been 
15 recently released from  prison.  Being a recent (past  90 days)  victim  of a shoot- 
ing was the  least frequent criterion present; although this  described more  than 
a  quarter (n = 31,  26.3%) of  the  clients. Thus,  the  typical   TRUCE  participant 
was someone between the  ages  of 16 and  25,  gang involved,  with  a history  of 
violent  crimes, and currently involved  in high-risk  street activity. 
20              A  review  of  the  client management  database with  respect to  the  quantity 
and  quality  of case  management also indicated the  Phoenix  TRUCE project was 
implemented  with  a  great deal   of  fidelity   during  the   project. As shown  in 
Table  3, outreach workers   assisted 19.5% of  clients with  job  readiness and 
25.4% with  job  preparation.
12  
Clients  were  referred to substance abuse  treat- 
25 ment  programs (13.6%), educational programs (26.3%), and  anger  management 
programs (10.2%) when  the  outreach worker  felt  it was appropriate. During the 
interactions with  clients, outreach workers  reported having  discussed employ- 
ment  during  15.6%  of the  contacts, substance abuse  during  10.8% of the  con- 
tacts,  emotional issues  during  23.9% of  the  contacts, and  nonviolent conflict 
30 resolution and  problem-solving during  48.4% of the  contacts.  Additionally, out- 
reach workers  helped mediate 51 conflicts during  client contacts. In summary, 
both  the  frequency and  general tenor of  the  contacts demonstrated a  good 
dosage  of client outreach effort. 
In addition to  the  youth  outreach and  intervention,  process measures indi- 
35          cated that the  Phoenix  TRUCE project was actively involved  in increasing com- 
 
 
 
11.  All clients were  identified by the  outreach workers  or  violence   interrupters and  were  subse- 
quently assessed for  inclusion  in case  management.  It  is our  understanding that all  of the  clients 
lived  in the  target area. Although  official  criminal  history  records are  not  available for  these cli- 
ents, it  does  appear that the  project identified a large  group  of high-risk  individuals  in the  target 
area  for participation in case  management. 
12.  Job  readiness focused on issues  related to  appropriate clothing  for  job  seeking  and  job  keep- 
ing,  acquiring  appropriate legal  documents and  identification for  proof  of  employment eligibility, 
and  transportation needs. Job  preparation consisted of  learning   how  to  locate job  openings  and 
complete  employment applications,  preparing  a  resume, and  practicing  successful  interviewing 
techniques.
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Table  3    Summary of client selection and risk reduction 
 
N                              % 
 
Client  selection 
Number  of clients                                                                              118                       100.0 
Gender
 
 
 
Race 
Male                                                                                         86                         72.9 
Female                                                                                     32                         27.1 
 
African-American                                                               93                         78.8 
Latino                                                                                       20                         16.9 
Native  American                                                                       3                           2.5 
Caucasian                                                                                   2                           1.7 
Total                                                                                       118                       100.0
Client  risk factors 
Gang involved                                                                       108                         89.0 
Core gang member                                                        67                         56.8 
Prior criminal  history                                                          100                         84.7 
Recent victim  of violence                                               31                         26.3 
Aged 16–25                                                                             79                         66.9 
Recently  incarcerated                                                  33                         28.0 
High-risk client (four  or more  criteria)                       118                       100.0 
 
Risk reduction 
Number  of clients                                                                              118                       100.0 
Assisted  with job readiness                                            23                         19.5 
Assisted  with job preparation                                       30                         25.4 
Substance abuse  treatment referrals                           16                         13.6 
Education program referrals                                           31                         26.3 
Client  was unemployed                                                   25                         21.2 
Anger management referrals                                         12                         10.2 
Number  of client contacts                                                             5,381                        100.0 
Discussed employment                                                  839                         15.6 
Discussed substance abuse                                                 587                         10.9 
Discussed educational issues                                         1,284                          23.9 
Discussed problem solving                                             2,621                          48.7 
Mediated client conflict                                                        51                             .9 
 
 
munity   awareness  about  the   costs   of   violence.  This  was   done   to   enlist 
broad-based community support for  changing  attitudes and  behaviors related 
to violence. More than  188 community activities and events were  held  over the 
project period. The activities and  events included community gardens (n = 98), 
canvassing   the   neighborhood  (n = 29),  holding  barbeques (n = 21),  community         5 
association meetings (n = 9),  peace marches (n = 4),  and  other client and  com- 
munity-focused activities  (n = 29).  Related, data  obtained from  stakeholders 
indicated that a large  number  of educational materials were  distributed as part 
of   the    projects   implementation.   Specifically,  more    than    11,000    public
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5          education  materials  were   distributed  throughout the   project. For  example, 
4,000  door  hangers, 3,500  fliers,  brochures, postcards, and posters, 1,500  wrist 
bands, and 1,150  t-shirts and hats  were  distributed.
13
 
Criminal  justice  participation in  TRUCE was  largely   focused  on  the   local 
police. The police  shared information with TRUCE staff about neighborhood vio- 
10 lence,  provided security during  events, attended partner meetings, and  were 
generally supportive of  requests by  partners. As expected,  outreach  workers 
and violence interrupters kept  a healthy distance from the  police  in public. This 
was in part  because they  were  concerned about their  street image. Specifically, 
they  were  concerned that their  clients would not  trust them  if they  knew that 
15          they  talked to the  police. Regardless, the  police  fulfilled  all expectations asked 
of them  by CPLC, and  most  importantly interviews with  outreach workers  and 
violence interrupters indicated that  the  police  often shared information with 
them, which allowed  TRUCE to target clients for services. 
In terms of  overall  implementation,  interviews with  key  stakeholders  indi- 
20 cated that over  the  course  of the  project there were  two  problems related to 
the  implementation of  Project TRUCE. The  first  was  related to  programmatic 
community embeddedness.  Specifically, project  TRUCE lacked   a  community 
advisory  board  and  faith-based involvement. Second, we  found  that the  geo- 
graphic  space  of Phoenix  did not  lend  itself  well  to  the  replication of the  Chi- 
25 cago  CeaseFire   model. Chicago  protocols and  technical advisors  call  for  the 
program  to   be   implemented  in  geographically  small   and   dense   (both   with 
respect to  population and  gun violence) neighborhoods. These  types  of neigh- 
borhoods  simply do not  exist in Phoenix. As the  TRUCE project progressed, one 
of  the  major issues  confronting CPLC and  the  technical advisors  in  Chicago, 
30 was related to  the  appropriateness of the  target area, which  became a source 
of contention between the  stakeholders in Phoenix  and  Chicago.  At the  heart 
of the  issue  was the  question: by what  factors are  sites  to  identify and  select 
an  appropriate target area?  Related, how  does  a city’s  concept of community 
play a role  in the  implementation of the  CeaseFire  model? 
35              Many of the  Phoenix  stakeholders felt  the  target area  was too  small and that 
in  order   to   better  address the   violence  problem  in  the   area   it  should   be 
expanded. For example, one  stakeholder stated, 
 
Out here  in Phoenix, South Phoenix, you can take  a bus for a long time  and not 
worry  about anything   or  walk  blocks  and  not  worry  about  anything, there  is 
40                   gangs  yes,  there’re  different gangs,  different sets  but  at least, it’s  not  so con- 
gested. It’s  not  congested and  that’s  one  of my biggest, I always  debate when 
it come  to this,  it’s like,  it’s not  the  same  as [Chicago]. 
 
 
 
 
13.  The TRUCE anti-violence message was fairly  general. The TRUCE slogan  was “Start  the  Peace. 
Stop  the   Violence.”  Most  of  the   fliers,   postcards, and  brochures had  pictures of  a  community 
member, violence interrupter,  or  outreach worker  with  the  quote, “We’ve  committed to  a life  of 
non-violence. You can  too.” One set  of postcards also  laid  out  the  legal  consequences of illegally 
carrying  or using a gun.
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On the  other hand, stakeholders from  Chicago  expressed the  need  to  have  a target  
area  that was geographically small  enough  to  walk,  but  had  a high con- centration of 
gun incidents. One technical advisor  from  Chicago stated:                    5 
 
[CeaseFire is] predicated on having a large  enough  concentration, you know,  of 
a  problem in order  to  impact that problem. And the  model  that we  use,  you 
have  to get  to know the  people who are  most  closely  associated with  the  prob- 
lem and  have  some  sort  of effect on them  and  for those  people that you really 
are  looking  to  change, or  help  change  over  the  long  term, that requires, we                 10 
think,   fairly  intensive contact.  You know,  three face-to-face a  month, three 
home   visits  a  month,  daily  phone   contact or  frequent  phone   contact. You 
know,  it is pretty intensive and  it becomes more  difficult  to  do that when  you 
are  chasing  all over  the  place. So from  a practical point  of view,  we think  it is 
difficult  to do the  model. [if the  area  is too  large]                                                                      15 
 
CPLC staff  repeatedly noted that the  concept of  a  self-defined neighborhood 
that is walkable and  has the  concentration of violence equal  to  neighborhoods 
in Chicago did not  exist in Phoenix. The urban  geography  looks and feels  differ- 
ent, and  the  density  of  residents and  gun  crime  is much  lower.
14  
In the  end, 
given   the   requirements  of  the   Chicago   technical  advisors,  most   of  those           20 
involved   in  the   Phoenix   TRUCE project  questioned whether  the   CeaseFire 
model  could  be  adapted to cities  that look and  feel  so different than  Chicago. 
As one  Chicago  technical advisor  stated, “… it  may  be  that this  is,  either the 
target area  wasn’t  the  right  target area, or it  could  be  that maybe  this  model 
isn’t  appropriate  for  this  city.   That’s  possible   too.”  Others   noted that  some          25 
adjustments might  need  to be made  to accommodate cities  with different geo- 
graphical space, from  the  size  of the  target area  to  the  time  of day and  week 
that outreach staff  routinely work.  One  Phoenix  stakeholder summarized this 
by saying,  “Do I feel  that we can  make  it like CeaseFire? Yes, we can.  Do I feel 
like,  that we can  make  it  with  the  same  concept  they  have?  No, I don’t.  No, I          30 
don’t.  We  gotta,  I  feel   that  Phoenix, it’s  a  complete  different  city   [than 
Chicago].” 
 
 
 
Impact  Findings 
 
To  measure  the   impact of  the   TRUCE project we  examined its  effect as  a 
whole  and  also  how  the  specifics  of  the  youth  outreach, in terms of  dosage,         35 
client  selection and  risk  reduction  (summarized in  the  above  section), were 
related to  changes in crime.  We first  examined the  impact of the  TRUCE pro- 
ject on violence and  shootings  in the  target area  by assessing  the within-area 
trends in  the  outcome data.  This  section examines whether there  were   any 
significant changes  in  the  average number of  incidents before and  after the           40 
 
 
 
14.  It should  be  noted that gangs in Phoenix  are  fairly  similar  to  those  in Chicago  with  respect to 
their  claiming  specific  geographic set  space  (Block & Block, 1993; Katz & Webb,  2006).
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 M SD M SD  
Shooting     
Target  area 4.00 (2.24) 5.95 (4.22) 1.95 .084 
Area A 3.26 (2.75) 4.00 (2.24) .74 .370 
Area B 4.68 (2.85) 4.79 (2.39) .11 .903 
Area C 2.32 (1.97) 2.63 (1.54) .31 .585 
 
Target  area 
 
38.84 
 
(8.03) 
 
36.11 
 
(6.91) 
 
−2.73 
 
.268 
Area A 59.47 (8.97) 67.16 (13.67) 7.69 .048 
Area B 57.79 (8.28) 56.16 (10.27) −1.63 .593 
Area C 40.63 (5.03) 42.47 (8.02) 1.84 .402 
 
Target  area 
 
46.95 
 
(9.27) 
 
45.68 
 
(8.89) 
 
−1.27 
 
.671 
Area A 70.79 (10.32) 77.84 (15.21) 7.05 .103 
Area B 70.11 (11.93) 66.16 (11.83) −3.95 .313 
Area C 46.05 (5.94) 47.63 (8.76) 1.58 .520 
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 implementation of the  TRUCE project. We conducted a t-test for difference of 
means  for  each  area  between the  41 months  prior  to  implementation and  the 
19 months  following  implementation. Table  4 displays  the  results. The analysis 
showed   that for  the   target and  comparison  areas   there were   no  significant 
 5 changes  in the  number of shooting  incidents, or the  overall  number of violent 
  incidents, between the  pre-implementation period   and  the  post-implementa- 
  tion  period. With respect to  assaults, there was one  significant change  in com- 
  parison  area   A  where   the  mean  number of  assaults increased from  about  59 
  per  month   in  the   pre-implementation period   to  about  67  per  month   in  the 
 10 post-implementation period. Given  the  lack  of  meaningful within-area  signifi- 
  cant  differences, we did not  compare between areas. 
  Next,  we controlled for trends in the  data, both  within  the  target and  com- 
  parison   areas,  through  time-series  analysis.  Different  models   were   run   to 
  assess  the  overall  effect of  the  TRUCE  program and  to  assess  the  impact of 
 15 program dosage, attention  to  risk reduction, and  client characteristics.  Time- 
  series  analysis  allowed  us to assess  those  activities that might  have  the  great- 
  est  impact on overall  violence, shootings, and  assaults. The analyses presented 
  below  are  for  the  programmatic effects only.  Each  effect corresponds with  a 
AQ3  unique   cross-sectional  time-series   model,  all   of   which   can   be   found   at 
 20 [www.omitted for  review  purposes]. The  full  models  control for  the  levels  of 
  violence in the  comparison areas,  the  trends in the  data over  time, and  any 
  seasonal effects that could  be  related to  a greater number of incidents during 
  specific  months  of the  year. 
 
Table  4    Change in police  incident reports pre-post truce implementation 
Pre-TRUCE                          Post-TRUCE  
Change        t-test sig
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assaults 
 
 
 
 
 
All violent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Pre-TRUCE refers to  the  19-month mean  prior  to  implementation and  the  Post-TRUCE value 
is the  mean  of the  19 months  after implementation.
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Table  5 displays  the  effects related to  the  dosage  of TRUCE implementation 
by  month. The  first  effect, Truce  Implementation,  is  simply  a  dichotomous         5 
variable for  the  target area  post-implementation. This tells  us that the  imple- 
mentation of the  TRUCE project was related to  a significant increase in shoot- 
ings,   and   a   significant    decrease  in   assaults.   Specifically,  the    program’s 
implementation corresponded to  an  increase of  3.2  shootings, a  decrease  of 
more  than  16 assaults per  month, and  an overall  decrease of more  than  16 vio-          10 
lent  incidents per  month.  However, the  reduction in  our  overall   measure  of 
violence was  largely  driven  by  the   assault category.  Further analysis  of  the 
data indicated that  there were   two  months   where   the   number of  shootings 
(November   and  December  2010)  were  abnormally high; however,  even  after 
removing  these two  months   from  the  analysis, the  direction and  the  signifi-          15 
cance of the  findings remained the  same. 
In terms of specific  dosage  levels, we  found  that the  number of active cli- 
ents  per  month  and  number of contacts with  clients were  significantly  related 
to   increases  in  shootings.  One  should   note,  however, that  these  increases 
were  small,  the  largest  being  an  increase of  .07  shootings  per  month. Differ-          20 
ently,  for   every   conflict   that  was  mediated  by  TRUCE staff,  we  found   a 
decrease of  almost  two  assaults (1.9)  and  a  decrease of  almost  three violent 
crimes  (2.7)  overall. Additionally, each  conflict  mediation had  a specific  num- 
ber  of  people involved,   and  the   number of  people involved  in  a  mediation 
was related to  our  outcome measures. Specifically, for  each  additional person           25 
who  was  involved  in  a  mediated conflict   there was  about a  fifth  of  a  call 
reduction in  assault (.17)  and  a  fifth  of  a  call  reduction for  all  violent   (.20) 
incidents per  month. 
Table  6 shows  the  effects of client selection on the  number of violent  inci- 
dents. The analysis  indicated that a number  of the  client characteristics were           30 
related to  slight, but  significant, increases  in shootings.  Specifically, whether 
they  were  female,  increases in the  number of core  gang  member clients,  cli- 
ents   with  a  prior  criminal   history, and  high-risk  clients were  all  significantly 
related to  an  increase in the  number of  shootings  in the  target area. Differ- 
ently, there were  four  client  characteristics that were  significantly  related to          35 
reductions in assaults. An increase of one  active gang  member client reduced 
assaults by 3.3 per  month. An increase in one  client with  recent violent  victim- 
ization  experience reduced assaults by one  per  month  and  having an additional 
client  in the target age  range  corresponded to a  reduction of  more  than  2.3 
assaults per  month. Finally,  an increase of one  client per  month  who had  been           40 
recently released from  prison  was  related to  a  reduction of  5.7  assaults per 
month. 
Table   6  shows   the   effects  of  the   variation  in  risk  reduction  activities 
implemented by TRUCE on the  number of shootings, assaults, and  overall  vio- 
lent   incidents.  Again,  a  number  of  activities  were   significantly   related  to          45 
increases  in  shootings.  Two  of  the   activities,  unemployed clients  (.38)   and
 R
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Table  5    Effect  of program  dosage  on violence by incident type 
 
 Shooting    Assault    All violent  
Predictor Coef. SE Effect  size  Coef. SE Effect  size  Coef. SE Effect  size 
TRUCE Implementation 3.201* (1.30) 1.43  −16.436** (5.13) −2.05  −16.575** (6.36) −1.79 
Number  of clients .074* (.04) .03  −.275 (.16) −.03  −.205 (.18) −.02 
Number  of contacts .007* (.00) .00  −.023 (.01) .00  .023 (.02) .00 
Number  of home  contacts .023 (.01) .01  −.073 (.05) −.01  −.068 (.06) −.01 
Number  of street contacts .039 (.03) .02  −.159 (.09) −.02  −.202 (.11) −.02 
Hours spent with clients .001 (.00) .00  −.005 (.00) .00  −.005 (.00) .00 
Conflicts  mediated .275 (.27) .12  −1.901** (.72) −.24  −2.660** (.85) −.29 
Number  of people in conflicts .028 (.03) .01  −.17* (.07) −.02  −.200* (.09) −.02 
 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
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Risk reduction 
Unemployed clients 
 
 
.382** 
 
 
(.15) 
 
 
−.637 
 
 
(.63) 
 
 
−.214 
 
 
(.73) 
Discussed problem-solving .013* (.01) −.042 (.02) −.044 (.03) 
Mediated client conflict .004 (.18) −.641 (.46) −.714 (.55) 
Referred clients to anger −4.237 (3.04) 2.503 (7.27) −.118 (8.97) 
management       
Discussed employment .047* (.02) −.086 (.06) −.057 (.08) 
Assisted  with job readiness .341 (.22) .011 (.68) .293 (.81) 
Assisted  with job preparation .097* (.04) −.205 (.13) −.104 (.16) 
Discussed substance abuse .046 (.02) −.116 (.07) −.124 (.09) 
Referred to substance abuse −.118 (.90) .052 (2.22) −.874 (2.66) 
 
Discussed educational issues 
 
.036** 
 
(.01)** 
  
(.05) 
 
−.0127* 
 
(.06) 
Referred to education program .546** (.20) −.376 (.54) .175 (.65) 
 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
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Table  6    Effect  of client selection and risk reduction on violence by incident type 
 
Shooting                     Assault                  All Violent 
 
Predictor                                         Coef.            SE          Coef.          SE         Coef.          SE 
 
Client  selection  
Male clients .093 (.05) −.336 (.21) −.253 (.25) 
Female  clients .290* (.13) −1.036 (.55) −.777 (.64) 
Gang involved  clients .588 (.36) −3.329** (.87) −3.795** (1.04) 
Core gang member clients .130* (.06) −.388 (.27) −.270 (.31) 
Clients  with prior  criminal .090* (.05) −.351 (.19) −.258 (.22) 
history       
High-risk clients .089* (.04) −.323 (.19) −.244 (.22) 
Recent victims  of violence .187 (.11) −.973* (.47) −.964 (.54) 
Clients  aged  16–25 .291 (.30) −2.334** (.85) –3.396** (.99) 
Clients  with recently .863 (.78) −5.654** (1.91) −5.999** (2.33) 
incarcerated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
referred to education program  (.55), were  significantly  related to  an  increase 
of about one  half  of a shooting  per  month. Interestingly, for  every  additional 
client that was referred to anger  management, there was a reduction of more 
than  four  shootings  per  month. This effect was not  significant largely  because         5 
there were  so few  referrals to  anger  management. Discussing problem  solving 
with  nonviolent  means   (.01), discussing   employment  needs   (.05),  discussing 
educational  needs   (.04),  and   assisting   with   job   preparation  (.10)   were   all 
significantly   associated  with  increases  in  shooting   incident reports,  although 
none   were   substantively  influential.  The   only   risk   reduction  activity  that         10 
significantly  reduced the  number of assaults was  discussing  educational issues 
with clients.
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  Discussion 
 
In the  present study, we  examined the  implementation of the  Phoenix  TRUCE 
5 project and  the  impact the  project had  on  neighborhood levels  of  violence. 
 The Phoenix  TRUCE Project was modeled after the  Chicago CeaseFire  program, 
 which  takes  a public  health approach in responding to  violence in the  commu- 
 nity.   We  first   examined  the   fidelity   of  program   implementation.   We  next 
 examined the  impact of the  project through a pre-test/post-test nonequivalent 
10 control  group   design.    Specifically,  we   examined data  from   the   targeted 
 neighborhood and  three  comparison neighborhoods before and  after program 
 implementation. 
 The implementation findings indicated that several of the  programming com- 
 ponents were  implemented fully.  For instance, all program  participants (100%) 
15 in Phoenix  met  the  qualifications for  being  at high risk for  violence compared 
 to  84% in Chicago.  Likewise,  the  risk factors associated with  individual’s partic- 
ipating   in  programming was  fairly  similar  across  city’s: about 89% of  partici- 
pants   in  Phoenix   were   gang  involved   compared  to  92% in  Chicago;   85% of 
 participants in  Phoenix  had  a  prior  history  of  offending compared  to  91% in 
20 Chicago,  and  26% of participants in Phoenix  reported being  a recent victim  of 
AQ4  a shooting  compared to  8% in Chicago (Skogan et al., 2009).  Similar to  Chicago 
  and  Baltimore,  the   majority  of  contacts  made   with  participants in  Phoenix 
  were  held  in-person (e.g. home, street,  and  office)  (Skogan et al., 2009;  Web- 
  ster,  Whitehill, Vernick,  & Curriero, 2012).  The  Phoenix  TRUCE project  also 
 25 held  substantially more  community events when  compared to some  other sites. 
  Phoenix,  for  instance, held  about  15–17  community events  per  month   
com- pared to  about 1–2 a month  in Baltimore (Webster, Whitehill, Vernick,  
& Par- ker,    2012).   Additionally,   the    local   police    department   regularly  
provided   intelligence about violence to outreach and crisis intervention workers. 
 30 Our analysis, however, also  found  that the  TRUCE  program  might  have  not 
  been  as  robust   in other areas  of  implementation.  For  example,  Chicago  con- 
  ducted about 6.6  mediations a month  and  these mediations primarily  focused 
  on  retaliations, gang  rivalries,  and  property conflicts   (Skogan  et al., 2008). 
  
35 
Phoenix’s mediation activity looked  a lot more  similar  to that of Pittsburgh and 
Baltimore where   about two  to  three mediations were  conducted each  month 
  and  these mediations were  often focused on gang  conflict, personal disputes, 
AQ5  domestic violence, and  drugs (Whitehill  et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2010).  Like- 
  wise,  while Phoenix demonstrated a strong commitment to the  public education 
  component of the  program, the  program might not  have  been  as well known as 
 40 they  were  in other communities. In Baltimore, for example, almost 70% of resi- 
  dents had observed CeaseFire materials (Webster, Whitehill, Vernick, & Parker, 
AQ6  2012) compared to 30% in Phoenix  (citation removed for review  purposes). 
Our  analysis  also  indicated that  comprehensive community embeddedness 
was   never   formally   implemented (e.g.  no   community  advisory   board,  no 
45          involvement with  the  faith-based community). This potentially resulted in lack
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of  strategic direction for  the  program and  reduced the  program’s  capacity to 
mobilize  larger  institutions to  change  the  culture of violence within  the  com- 
munity. This also might have  necessarily resulted in fewer  opportunities for cli- 
ents  to  access jobs  and  services. While these aspects of the  program deviated 
from  protocol,  clients in  Phoenix  were   contacted  frequently and  appear to          5 
have  been  referred to  the  same  types  of services as those  in other sites, albeit 
client  contacts  were   on  average  shorter  in  duration  in  Phoenix   (Webster, 
Whitehill, Vernick,  & Parker, 2012).  Furthermore, CPLC, the  program imple- 
menter, is  one  of  the   state’s  premier  NGOs. It  is  responsible  for  providing 
resources related  to  housing,   education,  employment,  employment training,          10 
behavior health, and  a variety of other social  services. It is well entrenched  in 
the  community and  has  the  capacity to  provide  most  of the  services  required 
of  CeaseFire. As a  result, while  the  implementing organization did  not  reach 
out  to  the  community for  this  particular initiative,  it had  the  capacity to  pro- 
vide substantial services to clients.                                                                                          15 
Our findings  also  suggested that the  Chicago  CeaseFire model  as it  pertains 
to  targeting a  densely   populated  neighborhood with  high  levels   of  violence 
may  not  translate well  to  more  suburban communities,  such  as  those  located 
in the  Southwest. For example,  Chicago  has  about  4.25  times  the  number of 
residents per  square mile  than  Phoenix  (11,841.8 vs.  2,797.7). Chicago  is also          20 
characterized  by  large   tenant high  rises,   substantial  pedestrian  traffic,  and 
reliance on  public  transportation (e.g. train, cabs), which  results in  violence 
being  highly  concentrated in fairly  small  geographic areas  (Morenoff  & Samp- 
son,  1997).  Phoenix  neighborhoods,  on  the  other hand, are  characterized  by 
scattered  development,  single-family homes, high  use  of  private  automobile         25 
transportation, and  little pedestrian traffic. Because  of  population decentral- 
ization,  violence is relatively dispersed (Robinson  et al., 2009).  For example, 
the  Hermoso  Park  neighborhood (a  1 mile  by 1.5  mile  area) was  found  to  be 
one  of the  most  violent  in the  state, but  yet  only experienced four  homicides 
in  the  12-months prior  to  the  intervention. Regardless   of  these spatial attri-         30 
butes,  Chicago   advisors   strongly   believed that  replication of  the   program 
required  it to be  implemented in a  small  geographic area.  It  is unclear what 
impact these geo-spatial characteristics have  on program implementation, and 
is  an  important  issue  for  policy-makers  and  researchers to  consider in  the 
future. It  could  be  that communities such  as  Phoenix  might  be  better served           35 
by hospital-based violence intervention programs that  prescribe similar  meth- 
ods  of  intervention but  participants are  recruited  through hospital admissions 
rather than  neighborhood activity (see  e.g. Cooper, Eslinger, & Stolley,  2006). 
Future  researchers should  examine the  costs  and benefits between faithful rep- 
lication and  appropriate  adaptability to  local  context given  the   vast  differ-         40 
ences  is sites  that are  implementing CeaseFire (Columbus,  Ohio, Port  of Spain, 
Trinidad, Iraq,  New York City, etc.). 
Our findings related to  the  impact of the  TRUCE project were  just  as mixed.  The  
primary   goal  of  the  intervention was  to  reduce  shootings. Our  analysis, however,   
showed    that   program  implementation  was   associated  with   an          45
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increase in shootings. As seen  in Table  5, Cohen’s  effect size  value  (d = 1.43) 
suggested that this  change  was  large,  substantively speaking. Specifically, we 
found  that the  implementation of  TRUCE  corresponded to  an  increase of  3.2 
shootings,  on  average, per  month,  controlling for  the   comparison areas   and 
5 the  trends in the  data. Furthermore, our  analysis  showed  that as  the  number 
of  clients  and   contacts  by  outreach  workers   increased,  so  did   shootings; 
although these  effects  were   very  small.   These   findings  are   consistent  with 
those  found  by Wilson and  Chermak  (2011)  in their  study  of  a  CeaseFire  pro- 
gram  in  Pittsburgh.  It  is  possible   that the   TRUCE program’s  deviation  from 
10 implementation protocol resulted in the  boomerang effect.  Or it could  be  that 
the  programming itself  was tied  to an increase in shootings. 
One possibility  is that the  shootings  in Phoenix, which are  often tied to gang 
rivalries, are  largely  a  reflection of  community norms  that are  supportive of 
retaliatory violence. A core  component of the  CeaseFire  model  involves  faith- 
15 based  leaders and  community coalitions against violence. As noted above, this 
component was  largely  absent in  the   implementation of  the  Phoenix  TRUCE 
project. While CPLC’s organizational capacity allowed  them  to sufficiently pro- 
vide client services, which in other sites  are  typically  provided through a num- 
ber   of  local   service   providers  vis-a-vis  a  community coalition,  the   lack  of 
20          community embeddedness, lack  of involvement by the  faith-based community, 
and  the  lack  of public  knowledge about the  project might  have  prohibited the 
program  from  altering  the   norms  and  values   of  the   community  away  from 
shootings  and toward the  peaceful resolution of conflict. 
Another   explanation  for  the   increase  in  shootings   is  also  plausible.  Prior 
25 research  dating   back   to  the   1960s  has  suggested that  street  outreach can 
result in the  unintended consequence of increasing neighborhood levels  of gang 
membership  and  delinquency.  For  example,  Klein  (1971)  reported that  the 
assignment of  caseworkers increased the  local  reputation of  particular gangs, 
which  helped to  attract new  members,  and  led  to  an  increased gang  problem 
30 in the  areas employing  detached workers. Spergel  (1995) reported similar  find- 
ings in his examination of a program  that was designed to  provide  job  training 
and  job  opportunities for gang members in Chicago.  Project staff  were  primar- 
ily comprised of  gang  leaders from  two  of  the  largest gangs  in Chicago.  The 
analyses indicated that  the  project was  a  failure by almost  all  accounts. Job 
35 training and  placement efforts were  unsuccessful as  gang  structures became 
more  sophisticated, and gang-motivated homicides increased. 
Much more   research is  needed to  determine the   causal   mechanisms  that 
result in such  a boomerang effect.  If implementation failures are  responsible, 
causal   components  should  be  identified  and  policy-makers  and  practitioners 
40          should   be  warned about  potential  adverse effects  if  programming  deviates 
from  that which  is prescribed. If particular components (e.g. street  outreach 
work)  actually cause  some  forms  of  violence to  increase, their  use  should  be 
moderated to only those  situations that necessitate their  implementation. 
With the  above  said,  a secondary concern of the  present study  was to  exam- 
45          ine  the  impact of the  program  on other forms  of violence. We found  that the
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TRUCE project had  a large  and  significant  impact on assaults and  other violent 
crime. As seen  in Table  5, Cohen’s effect size (d) values  were  −2.05  for assault 
and  −1.79  for  all  violent   crime.  Time-series analysis  indicated that  program 
implementation  corresponded to  a  decrease of  more  than   16.6  total  violent 
incidents and  16.4  assaults on  average per  month, when  controlling for  the           5 
comparison areas and  the  trends in the  data. Coupled  with  our implementation 
data these findings  suggest  that the   more   conflicts   that were   mediated (d 
= −.24)  and the  more  people involved  in mediated conflicts  (d = −.29), caused a greater 
decrease in assaults. Likewise, our analyses revealed that assaults sub- stantially  
decreased as  the  program   increased in  the  number of  clients who          10 were  
gang-involved (d = −1.35), aged  16–25  (d = −.95), recent victims  of  vio- 
lence  (d = −.39), and recently released from  prison  increased (d = −2.3).15 
While we can  only speculate as to  the  reason for the  decline in assaults and 
other forms  of violence, it might  be that the  Phoenix  TRUCE program’s empha- 
sis on mediations involving personal altercations and  domestic violence, which          15 
represented 50% of  mediations in  Phoenix,  might  have  directly impacted the 
crimes  associated with  our measures of assault. In other words,  the  benefits of 
the  project might  have  been  restricted to  those  problems that the  project dis- 
proportionately  focused on—personal altercations.  It  might  be  that gang  vio- 
lence, which  is  often  expressed  through shootings; and  assaults,  which  are           20 
often a  result of  personal altercations,  are  differentially impacted by media- 
tion  and  community mobilization.  Mediations  might  be  an  effective strategy 
for  responding to  assaults because their  origins  are  more  likely  based  on per- 
sonal,  and  not  group  level, conflict. Conversely, in the  absence of community 
mobilization tactics that changes  neighborhood cultural norms  about  violence,         25 
mediation, and  street outreach left  on  their   own  might  amplify  gang-related 
violence as discussed above. 
Taken  together, these findings  suggest  that while  some  components of  the 
CeaseFire  strategy (and  specific  types  of  clients) are  associated with  positive 
outcomes for  some  forms  of  violence (i.e.  assaults); other components might          30 
have  led  to  a boomerang effect for other forms  of violence (i.e. shootings). By 
lumping  all  of  these components and  their   activities together under  a  broad 
measure of “intervention,”  might  have  masked  those  particular components of 
the  program   that were  driving  positive   (and  negative) outcomes.  Identifying 
those  components that have  the  greatest effect on violence reduction can  help          35 
policy-makers  design   more   effective  and   efficient  programs  in  the   future. 
Strategies such  as Chicago  CeaseFire  often become a cocktail of interventions 
focused  on  a  specific  area   and  type   of  people.  Researchers may  know  that 
each   of  the   components  of  the   intervention  works  independently,  but   we 
rarely  know how well they  work when  administered simultaneously. Just as the           40 
interaction between some  medications can  result in an  adverse reaction for  a 
 
 
 
15. We do not  add  the  effect sizes for of client selection on violence by incident type  due  to space 
limitations. For this information contact the  authors.
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10 
Prior to the  interpretation of the  findings being complete we note  three limi- 
tations to  the  present study. First, the  Phoenix  TRUCE project might  not  serve 
as  an  ideal  replication of  the  Chicago  CeaseFire   given  the  geo-spatial differ- 
ences  between Chicago  and  Phoenix  as noted above. Second, the  main  goal of 
Chicago  CeaseFire  model  is to reduce homicides, however, given the  low num- 
ber  of homicides in the  TRUCE target area  the  project could  not  be  evaluated 
 based  on this  criterion. Third,  given  our  use  of a nonequivalent control group 
 design  our findings might  have  been  subject to  sampling  bias because our com- 
 parison  areas  were  not  perfectly matched. For example, the  targeted neighbor- 
 hood  was  comprised  of  a  substantial  number   of  African-American  residents 
15 (40%) when  compared to the three comparison areas (4–10%). This issue  is of 
particular importance given the  potential of differences between African-Amer- 
 ican  and  Hispanic  gangs in Phoenix. Prior  research suggests  that almost  80% of 
 gang  members in  Phoenix  are  Hispanic  and  about  15% are  African-American. 
 Related, anecdotal evidence suggests  that  African-American gangs  in Phoenix 
20 are  more  violent  and more  heavily  involved  in street-level drug trafficking than 
 Hispanic  gangs  and  that street gang  violence in Phoenix  is largely  intra-racial, 
 in  part   because of  segregation and  adjacent turf  boundaries. (Katz  & Webb, 
 2006).  Therefore, it  is possible  that the  selection of the  target area, and  the 
 subsequent inclusion  of a high proportion of African-American clients in the  tar- 
25 get  area  might  have  increased the  probability of clients being  involved  in vio- 
 lence  when  compared to  those  living in the  comparison areas. With the  above 
 said communities in the  United  States and elsewhere have  been  eagerly looking 
 for  a silver  bullet  to reduce violence. The result has  been  a rush  to  adopt the 
 Chicago  CeaseFire model, believing  that it  is an  effective model  that has  the 
30 potential to dramatically reduce violence. Combined, evaluations of  the  Chi- 
 cago  CeaseFire model  have  demonstrated that such  a complex  strategy can  be 
 implemented in  a  fairly  short   period   of  time. Especially  when  compared to 
 other comprehensive strategies to  respond to gangs  (e.g. the  Spergel  Model). 
 However, our findings,  coupled with others suggest that thorough evaluations of 
35 the  Chicago Ceasefire  model  continue to be needed in a variety of contexts and 
 environments. It  is still  unclear whether the  model  results in  decreased  vio- 
 lence, has no impact on violence, or it increases violence. 
 It might  be that the  varying results between sites  are  the  consequence of an 
 interaction between site  selection and  the  proscribed treatment.  Chicago  and 
AQ7 40 Baltimore are  both  chronic  gang cities  that have  had  long-standing gang prob- 
  lems  (Spergel  & Chak,  1990).  Their  gangs  have  traditionally been  more  orga- 
  nized  and  cohesive (Burns,  2003; Decker,  Bynum, & Weisel,  1998).  Conversely, 
  Phoenix  and  Pittsburgh have  been  characterized as emerging gang cities  (Sper- 
  gel & Chak, 1990).  Gang problems in these two  communities have  not  been  as 
 45 organized  or  as  cohesive  (Decker,  Katz,  & Webb,  2008;  Wilson  & Chermak, 
  2011).  As alluded to  by Wilson and  Chermak  (2011),  the  interaction between 
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patient;  policy-makers and  researchers should  also  be  attuned to  the  fact  that 
multiple treatments  in  a  community  can  backfire; even  if  those   treatments 
come  from  the  same  program. 
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the  treatment and  the  nature of  the  community’s gang  problem might have 
resulted in divergent results between replication sites. In Phoenix  where  gangs 
are  loosely  organized and lack substantial cohesion, it is possible  that outreach 
workers  might  have  increased participation in gangs,  increased gang cohesion,          5 
and increased gun-related violence. However, we lack the  data to examine this 
possibility.  In  the   future,  replications of  Chicago   Ceasefire   might  consider 
adding  a  research component that  examines changes   in  the   gangs  and  gang 
cohesion prior  to and during  program  implementation. 
Regardless, those  who are  implementing (or who are  planning  to  implement)         10 
the  program should  be  alerted to  the  potential for  adverse effects, and  moni- 
toring  and  evaluation of the  program should  be  given  high priority  so that any 
unintended   consequences  can   be   addressed  sooner    rather  than    later   if 
required. 
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